This is simply false. PWRās were in part chosen because they are resistant to nuclear proliferation.
There are countries with PWRs that have no nuclear weapons (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, among many others) while there are countries with nuclear weapons that have no power reactors at all (North Korea, Israel).
Thereās several fairly simple reasons for this.
For starters, PWRās donāt produce as much plutonium as reactors designed for WGPu (Weapons-grade plutonium) production and theyāre not amenable to online refueling. This latter point creates a considerable problem for a nation state intent on producing WGPu with a power reactor and separating it for weapons production. For one, you cannot expose the fuel to neutron flux beyond a relatively short period or it will turn into RGPu (Reactor-grade plutonium). A fraction of your precious Pu-239 absorbs an extra neutron, turning into Pu-240. That Pu-240 has a tendency to spontaneously fission. So, once you exceed a small percentage of Pu-240 it is no longer useful for weapons.
Additionally, if a power reactor used for energy production begins to shutdown frequently for re-fueling, the IAEA tends to notice.
Further, a power reactor is quite a lot more expensive to build than the kind of reactor used for weapons production. You have to operate them at high pressure (to get the high temperature), high temperature, and include a lot of power conversion equipment that you simply donāt need.
Instead, take a look at how the Americans, Soviets, and British produced the bulk (all?) of their weapons-grade material. Windscale used air cooling to blow air through graphite channels with fuel bundles that were continuously being pushed through to the back from the front reactor face. Hanford-B did something similar, but water cooled their reactor. These were relatively simple designs - horizontal fuel channels in what was essentially a large block of graphite - and they had large fuel re-processing facilities co-located to these reactors and generated an absolutely enormous amount of waste in the process.
Regardless, if weāre going to criticize nuclear fission for the potential for WGPu proliferation, then the same kind of criticism should be applied to any nuclear fusion projects that use neutronic fusion (which is almost all of them), as the same risks apply (or may be even greater due to the higher neutron energies involved).
Lastly, a nation state can skip the plutonium production thing and just enrich weapons-grade uranium, of which you donāt need a reactor for. This is what was done with the āLittle Boyā bomb dropped on Hiroshima.