Automated Network Threat Response

On up-streaming address block requests:

Most servers are hosted in some way, so the first hop will usually be the actual physical hardware server (or final routing hardware controller), so any request from a hosted server will protect all servers behind that “gateway”.

The second hop will be something within the LAN that manages network segments, while the third hop will be probably be “network gateway” of some sort (router/firewall/DMZ/managed switch), that may or may not also be DNS/DHCP server.

So within three hops an entire LAN can be protected from bogus incoming traffic.

Each up-stream block request needs to be parsed as an internal only source, and to verify no internal networks are being blocked due to malicious user or targeted server has already been compromised.

Due to the way hosting works (at least some hostin that already has on hosted SSH pipes, and/or control panel statistics review - graphs) a pull process could be used instead of push process. Then colated pushing directly to the front facing “gateway” device/service from an already trusted source, should still be again, block address reviewed. Physical connection sould even be network segrigated through the hardware management port to help free up internal network traffic, especially in the case of high volumes ranging in DDOS limits.

A list of addresses would be smallest, however the up-stream destination could require log entries for verification, which could then be cross-referenced with previous/current up-stream activity. On large hosting networks a colation server may also handle up-stream analysis management and could also (at the same time) be used as an internal network honey pot if an internal VPN were used to handle blocking management.

The reality of the world today is, an attacker may be comming from within, and the last thing you need on a network, is a propigated domino effect that started “at your end”, but that should not stop you from “trying to clean up the intenet” at the same time.